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Acts and Omissions as Positive and
Negative Causes
RICHARD W WRIGHT*

I.

INTRODUCTION

I

NDIVIDUAL MORAL OR legal responsibility for an actual or potential state of affairs does not exist unless one’s conduct (possibly) was a
cause of that state of affairs.1 Conduct includes omissions as well as
acts. In this chapter, the terms ‘act’, ‘omission’, and ‘cause’ are used in their
core factual senses, unburdened by the normative factors that are often
loaded onto or confused with them. An act is simply a volitional physical
movement or exertion of a part of one’s body, while an omission is a
volitional failure to move or exert a part of one’s body in a specific way.2 A
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
Permission is hereby granted to copy for noncommercial purposes as long as appropriate
citation is made to this publication.
1
I focus here on interactive justice rather than distributive justice. See Richard W Wright,
‘The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility’ (2003) 40 University of San Diego Law
Review 1425, 1429-34; Richard W Wright, ‘The Principles of Justice’ (2000) 75 Notre Dame
Law Review 1859, 1883-92.
2
An omission or ‘negative act’ rarely involves a complete lack of motion or exertion,
contrary to what was literally stated but probably not intended by Jeremy Bentham:
[Acts] may be distinguished . . . into positive and negative. By positive are meant such as
consist in motion or exertion: by negative, such as consist in keeping at rest; that is, in
forbearing to move or exert oneself in such and such circumstances. Thus to strike is a
positive act: not to strike on a certain occasion, a negative one. Positive acts are styled also
acts of commission, negative, acts of omission or forbearance.
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1823) (New
York, Hafner Press, 1948) ch VII s VIII, 72. Bentham assumed that acts and omissions are
volitional, but he was not concerned with providing a precise account of the nature of the
required volition. Ibid, at 72 fn 1. For the purpose of this chapter, I also do not need a precise
account, but I think it is helpful to note, as suggested by my colleague, Richard Warner, that
the movements or exertions (or lack thereof) need not be consciously controlled by one’s will.
For example, moving one’s arms or standing completely still while lecturing is conduct,
regardless of whether one is consciously aware of one’s doing so, but movements or failures to
move are not conduct if they are the result of a pure muscular reflex or the application of
external force or if they occur while one is unconscious or soundly asleep. The volition
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cause is a condition that contributed, from a purely factual, scientific
standpoint, to some result.3
Omissions raise difficulties for both theoretical and ‘commonsense’
accounts of causation. Although from a commonsense, intuitive perspective, lawyers and lay persons often identify omissions—such as the failure
to water a plant or to pay attention when driving—as causes of losses or
harms, some philosophers have trouble with the idea that an omission—
the absence of something—can cause anything. As John Stuart Mill stated,
‘From nothing, from a mere negation, no consequences can proceed’.4
Conversely, from a commonsense, intuitive perspective, lawyers and lay
persons often fail to identify omissions as causes in situations in which,
from a theoretical or more carefully considered practical perspective, they
are seen to be causes. For example, legal texts and cases routinely treat the
failure to build a dam to a sufficient height or to properly maintain its
spillways to prevent flooding during ordinary storms as not being a cause
of the dam’s overflow during an extraordinary storm that would have
produced the overflow even if the dam were built to a proper height and its
spillways were properly maintained.5 As I have previously explained, these
dam overflow cases are instances of causal overdetermination, which
present philosophical and analytical difficulties even when acts rather than
omissions are the source of the causal overdetermination.6
The greatest difficulties seem to exist when multiple omissions overdetermine a causal process. An often cited example is the Saunders case, in

requirement applies only to the alleged act or omission itself, not to its consequences. My
activating my muscles to take a step is volitional, even if I am unaware and have no reason to
foresee that my doing so will set off a hidden trigger for an explosive. On the other hand, my
being pushed by someone else onto the trigger or falling onto it due to an epileptic seizure
does not involve any act or omission by me and, thus, does not constitute conduct on my part.
3
Considerable confusion exists due to the use of causal language to refer to not merely the
issue of factual causation but also the issue of normative responsibility. See Richard W
Wright, ‘Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the
Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts’ (1988) 73 Iowa Law Review 1001, 1004-14.
Additional confusion results from the use of the word ‘cause’ to refer to conditions that
would have been but were not actually causes since their potential causal efficacy was
preempted by the actual cause. This is the case with Hart and Honoré’s ‘additional cause’ and
‘alternative cause’ categories and David Fischer’s ‘multiple sufficient cause’, ‘successive cause’,
and ‘dependently sufficient cause’ idioms. See HLA Hart and Tony Honoré, Causation in the
Law, 2nd edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985) 235–53; David A Fischer, ‘Causation
in Fact in Omission Cases’ (1992) Utah Law Review 1335, 1337 fn 5, 1349-50; David A
Fischer, ‘Successive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm’ (1999) 66 Tennessee Law
Review 1127, 1127-30; David A Fischer, ‘Insufficient Causes’ (2006) 94 University of
Kentucky Law Review 277, 279, 281.
4
John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 8th edn (London,
Longmans, Green & Co, 1872) bk III ch V s 3.
5
Eg, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) § 432, comment b and illustration 2
[Restatement Second].
6
Richard W Wright, ‘Causation in Tort Law’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 1735,
1799-1800; Wright, Legal Responsibility, above n 1, at 1437-40; see pt III below.
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which a collision occurred when a motorist driving a rental car allegedly
did not attempt to brake until it was too late to avoid the collision, but the
brakes allegedly were defective due to a lack of proper inspection and
maintenance by the rental car company and therefore would not have
stopped the car in time even if the driver had applied them earlier.7 In this
and other cases involving a failure to attempt to use (in a timely, proper
manner) a missing or inadequate safeguard (a safety device or warning),
courts routinely hold that the fact that the safeguard was missing or
inadequate was not a cause of the unavoided injury—unless there was no
attempt to use the safeguard because it was known that the safeguard did
not exist or was inadequate, in which case the failure to provide an
adequate safeguard was a necessary condition for, and hence clearly a
cause of, the injury.8 In those cases in which the courts discuss the causal
status of the failure to attempt to use the safeguard, they hold that it was a
cause of the injury.9 At least one of the omissions must have been a cause,
since, considered together, they were a necessary condition for the occurrence of the injury. However, intuitive evaluations of causation in these
types of situations reportedly are mixed,10 and their proper theoretical
resolution is controversial. Indeed, some have argued that it is impossible
to resolve the causal issue in these cases, or any overdetermined-causation
case, through a purely factual, non-normative account of causation, and
that this impossibility undermines the very idea of such an account.11
I have argued that there is a purely factual, non-normative concept of
causation that underlies and is embodied in the NESS (necessary element of
a sufficient set) test for singular instances of causation, which—given
sufficient information about the particular factual situation and the possibly applicable causal laws—can be used to resolve any causal issue,

7

Saunders System Birmingham Co v Adams 117 So 72 (Ala 1928) [Saunders].
Eg, Saunders, above n 7; Rouleau v Blotner 152 A 916 (NH 1931) (alleged failure of
driver to signal prior to left turn, but driver of oncoming car was not looking forward);
Weeks v McNulty 48 SW 809 (Tenn 1898) (failure to provide fire escape, which hotel guest
did not check for or attempt to use); Safeco Insurance Co v Baker 515 So 2d 655 (La App 3d
Cir 1987) (inadequate instructions, which however were not read); McWilliams v Sir William
Arrol & Co [1962] 1 All ER 623 (HL) (failure to supply safety belt, which would not have
been used if it had been supplied).
9
Fischer, Omission Cases, above n 3, at 1354.
10
Fischer, Insufficient Causes, above n 3, at 314-17.
11
Eg, Fischer, Omission Cases, above n 3, at 1335, 1344-60; Fischer, Insufficient Causes,
above n 3, at 288-89; Jane Stapleton, ‘Perspectives on Causation’ in Jeremy Horder (ed),
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Fourth Series (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000)
61-66, 77, 79-80, 81-84; Jane Stapleton, ‘Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of
Liability for Consequences’ (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 941, 957 fn 38, 966-67, fns
60-61.
8
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including the most difficult multiple omission cases.12 In this chapter I
retrace and elaborate that argument, emphasising the importance of
understanding the sense of sufficiency in the NESS test and the differences
between positive causation and negative causation while building toward a
discussion of overdetermination by multiple negative conditions.

II.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CAUSATION

How can an omission—an absence of something—cause anything? Mill
himself provides the answer, wrapped around his seemingly contrary
statement that ‘[f]rom nothing, from a mere negation, no consequences can
proceed’:
[A sentry’s] being off his post was no producing cause [of the army’s being
surprised by the enemy], but the mere absence of a preventing cause: it was
simply equivalent to his non-existence. From nothing, from a mere negation, no
consequences can proceed. All effects are connected, by the law of causation,
with some set of positive conditions; negative ones, it is true, being almost
always required in addition. In other words, every fact or phenomenon which
has a beginning invariably arises when some certain combination of positive
facts exists, provided certain other positive facts do not exist . . ..
The cause, then, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions
positive and negative taken together; the whole of the contingencies of every
description, which being realised, the consequent invariably follows. The negative conditions, however, of any phenomenon, a special enumeration of which
would generally be very prolix, may be all summed up under one head, namely,
the absence of preventing or countervailing causes.13

Several different causal processes are at issue in Mill’s example. The army’s
being surprised will occur through a causal process that includes the
enemy’s stealthy approach unless, through a different causal process, some
preventing cause intervenes. A preventing cause prevents the successful
completion of the prevented causal process by eliminating one or more of
its necessary positive conditions. One possible preventing cause of the
enemy’s attempted surprise of the army is the army’s being forewarned by
its sentry. Going one level deeper in the causal analysis, the question is why
this forewarning did not occur. It failed due to the absence of the sentry,
since the sentry’s presence is a necessary positive condition for the
successful completion of the forewarning causal process. The sentry’s
absence prevented the forewarning causal process from occurring, and
12
See Wright, above n 6, at 1788-813; Wright, above n 3, at 1018-42; Richard W Wright,
‘Once More Into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal
Responsibility’ (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 1071, 1101-9, 1123-31; Wright, Legal
Responsibility, above n 1, at 1440-50.
13
Above n 4, at bk III ch V s 3.
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thus, along with the absence of other possible preventing causes, ensured
the successful completion of the surprise causal process. A condition (eg,
the sentry’s absence) that causes the failure of a possible preventing cause
(forewarning by the sentry), by negating a necessary positive condition for
the occurrence of the preventing cause, is a negative cause of the consequence of the unprevented causal process (the army’s being surprised by
the enemy).
As Mill notes, for any particular causal process there is a multitude of
possible preventing causes that will prevent the successful completion of
the causal process by preventing the existence of one of its necessary
positive conditions. Mill’s omnibus negative condition—the absence of any
preventing cause—encompasses all the many different possibilities. If the
necessary positive conditions for the causal process were fully specified in
complete detail, there would be no need to specify the absence of any
preventing cause, since the satisfaction of all the necessary positive
conditions would be inconsistent with the existence of any preventing
cause. However, since such a complete, detailed listing of all the necessary
positive conditions is rarely if ever possible in practice, Mill’s omnibus
negative condition fills the descriptive void, while also emphasising the
importance of always considering the possible existence of preventing
causes. Moreover, in many situations—for example, the death of a plant or
animal due to a lack of food or water—an attempt to describe the cause by
listing all the necessary positive conditions without mentioning the critical
negative condition would, at the least, be unilluminating.
Omissions generally operate as negative causes of some consequence, by
precluding the occurrence of a possible preventing cause. However, omissions can and often do operate as positive causes, when a sentient being’s
observation of an omission affects that being’s conduct. For example, a
military officer’s noticing a private’s failure to salute may cause the officer
to reprimand or otherwise discipline the private, an umpire’s noticing a
ballplayer’s failure to touch a base will cause the umpire to call the player
out, and a mother’s noticing a child’s failure to brush her teeth may cause
the mother to instruct the child to do so.
In the analysis of causation, it is the distinction between positive
causation and negative causation that is significant, rather than the
distinction between acts and omissions. The philosophical and analytical
difficulties posed by omissions as negative causes are posed also by acts
when those acts similarly give rise to negative causation—the failure of
some preventing or counteracting cause. For example, the act of removing
a safety device or damaging it so that it no longer works results in a
situation identical to that which exists if there had been no safety device in
the first place. The act of removing the top X feet from a dam or filling its
spillways with debris results in a situation identical to that which exists if
the dam initially lacks those X feet of extra height or if its spillways fill
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with debris due to a lack of proper maintenance. The act of taking away a
child’s food results in a situation identical to not supplying food in the first
place or to the child’s failure to eat supplied food.

III.

OVERDETERMINED POSITIVE CAUSATION

It is commonly recognised that the usual legal test for causation—the
necessary condition (‘but for’ or sine qua non) test—fails to reach the
proper result in situations involving causal overdetermination—that is,
when there is (or may be) more than one condition that would have been
sufficient (in conjunction with other existing conditions) for the occurrence
of the consequence on the particular occasion. A frequently mentioned
situation involves two fires, each of which was sufficient by itself to
destroy some property, which merge and destroy the property. Since
neither fire—nor any possible alternative condition—was necessary given
the existence of the other fire, the necessary condition test would result in
the clearly erroneous conclusion that neither fire was a cause of the
destruction of the property, which rather somehow mysteriously occurred
without any cause.
To reach the correct result in situations involving causal overdetermination, some test other than the necessary-condition test must be used.14 In
these situations the courts usually state that a condition was a cause if it
was a ‘substantial factor’, made a ‘material contribution’, or simply
‘contributed’.15 The words ‘factor’ and ‘contribute’ in each of these
formulations merely restate the causal question without providing any test
for resolving it. In the absence of any workable test, the unqualified
contribution question—best posed as ‘did it contribute, in even the most
minimal way’—is an improvement on asking whether the condition was ‘a
cause’ or ‘the cause’, since these latter formulations, especially the last,
14
An aggregate necessary-condition test would treat the two fires as a group as a cause,
but it is over-inclusive. It would designate both fires as a cause even if one arrived first and
preempted the other, and it would recognise causally irrelevant conditions as causes by
including them with the two fires in the group being tested. A modified necessary-condition
test, which asks whether the condition at issue was necessary for the occurrence of the
consequence at the time that it occurred, would not be over-inclusive and would correctly
identify more causes than the usual necessary-condition test. However, in many situations
(including our two-fires case), it might be difficult to determine whether the condition at issue
had any effect on the timing of the consequence, and the condition might still be a cause even
if it had no effect on the timing. See Wright, Once More, above n 12, at 1114.
15
Eg, March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 99 ALR 423 (HCA) (material
contribution); Athey v Leonati [1996] 3 SCR 458 (materially contributed); Sew Hoy & Sons
Ltd v Coopers & Lybrand (1996) 1 NZLR 392 (CA) (material contribution); Fairchild v
Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd (2002) [2003] 1 AC 32 (HL) (material contribution);
Kingston v Chicago & Northwestern Ry Co 211 NW 913 (Wis 1927) (substantial factor);
Mitchell v Gonzales 819 P 2d 872 (Cal 1991) (substantial factor).
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commonly lead people to focus on only one of many contributing
conditions—the most important one given their particular purpose or
perspective—and thus import normative considerations into what should
be a purely factual analysis. The ‘substantial factor’ and ‘material contribution’ formulations explicitly bring (unelaborated and unspecified) quantitative, qualitative, and normative considerations into the causal analysis,
by requiring not merely a causal contribution but also that the contribution be ‘substantial’ or ‘material’. They thereby confound the factual issue
of causal contribution with the normative issue of the extent of legal
responsibility for tortiously caused consequences—a nonfactual policy
issue that should be clearly recognised and analysed as such, rather than as
an issue regarding factual causation.16
What test do people implicitly employ to reach the correct conclusion
regarding causation in the situation involving two independently sufficient
fires that merge and destroy the property? The answer is stated in the
question: a test of sufficiency rather than necessity. Not sufficiency in the
strict sense of the condition’s being sufficient by itself (it is doubtful that
this is ever true), nor sufficiency in the trivial weak sense of merely being
part of a set of conditions that is sufficient (this would treat anything as a
cause, no matter how irrelevant it was to the sufficiency of the set), but
rather sufficiency in the strong sense of being part of the complete
instantiation of a set of conditions the specification of which includes only
those conditions that are necessary for the sufficiency of the set.17 In causal
analysis, the relevant set is the antecedent (‘if’ part) of a causal law. A
causal law is a statement that describes an empirically derived relation
between a set of conditions (called the antecedent) and a condition (called
the consequent) such that the complete instantiation of all the conditions in
the antecedent on a particular occasion is sufficient for the instantiation of
the consequent, the instantiation of which occurs subsequent to (or
perhaps simultaneously with) the instantiation of all the conditions in the
antecedent.18 Thus, a condition was a cause of some consequence if and
16
Wright, above n 6, at 1742-50, 1781-84; Wright, above n 3, at 1012-14; Wright, Once
More, above n 12, at 1073-80. This is true even if ‘material’ and ‘substantial’ are interpreted
in a purely quantitative manner. Preclusion of liability is inappropriate when the contributing
condition, although de minimis, was a necessary or independently sufficient condition, or
when all the other contributing conditions also were de minimis. See Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Proposed Final Draft No 1) (2005) § 36 and comments a
& b [Draft Restatement Third]; Wright, Legal Responsibility, above n 1, at 1449-50, fn 84.
17
Wright, above n 3, at 1020-21.
18
Causal laws have a direction or order of succession. The conditions specified in the
antecedent of the causal law, when fully instantiated, are a cause of the occurrence of the
condition specified in the consequent, but not vice versa. This directionality is incorporated in
the proper sense of sufficiency: (being part of) the complete instantiation of the antecedent of
the relevant causal law. It precludes supposed problems such as being able to treat the length
of a shadow ‘cast’ by a flagpole as the cause of the flagpole’s height, on the ground that
knowing the length of the shadow and the angle of the sun is sufficient to calculate the height
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only if it was part of the complete instantiation of the antecedent of a
causal law that specifies, as Mill stated, ‘the sum total of the conditions
positive and negative taken together; the whole of the contingencies of
every description, which being realised, the consequent invariably follows’.19
Our knowledge of ‘the sum total of the conditions’ in the antecedent of
the causal law is based on experience and empirical investigation. To
determine whether a condition really is part of a causal law—whether it is
necessary for the sufficiency of the set of antecedent conditions in the
causal law—scientists employ Mill’s Difference Method in carefully
designed experiments to see if removing the condition makes a difference
in the occurrence of the consequent.20 Our knowledge of causal laws often
is incomplete, and even when it is complete we rarely refer to completely
specified causal laws. We rather employ causal generalisations, which are
incompletely specified causal laws that have only as much specificity as is
possible and needed to resolve the causal issue in the particular situation.
For example, we usually refer to the causal generalisation that specifies
that bringing a flame into contact with combustible material causes that
material to burn, without referring to other necessary antecedent conditions such as the presence of oxygen or the absence of a soaking
rain—unless the latter expected conditions did not exist in the particular
situation or, conversely, existed but were not expected.
This conception of causation underlies the NESS (necessary element of a
sufficient set) test for singular instances of causation that was first
articulated by Herbert Hart and Tony Honoré,21 which I have refined,
extended, and defended in several articles. Under the NESS test, a
condition contributed to some consequence if and only if it was necessary
for the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent conditions that was
of the flagpole. See Richard Fumerton and Ken Kress, ‘Causation and the Law: Preemption,
Lawful Sufficiency, and Causal Sufficiency’ (2001) 64(4) Law & Contemporary Problems 83,
93 (discussing this common example). The length of the shadow is the consequent of the
relevant empirically derived causal law, rather than being part of the antecedent.
19
Above n 4, text at n 13.
20
Ibid, at bk III ch V s 3, ch VIII ss 1-4, ch X ss 1-3. It is often stated that, to be a cause,
a condition must ‘make a difference’. Eg Hart and Honoré, above n 3, at 29, 34-35. This is
true, but two possible implications must be avoided, as Hart and Honoré generally recognise.
Ibid, at 29, 112-13, 122-25; but see n 27 below. The first erroneous implication is that the
caused situation must be different than the preexisting situation. In many cases, a condition
causes the continuation of, rather than a change in, the preexisting situation—for example,
the preservation of plant or animal life by the intake of food or water. In these (and all other)
situations, the cause ‘makes a difference’ in relation to what would otherwise subsequently
occur in its absence. The second erroneous implication is that the difference would not have
occurred in the absence of the condition at issue. As is discussed in the text above, this is not
true in situations involving causal overdetermination, in which the causal condition does not
‘make a difference’ by itself, but rather, as part of a group of causally relevant conditions.
21
HLA Hart and AM Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1959) 105-7.
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sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence. The relevant notion of
sufficiency is the instantiation of each condition in the antecedent of the
relevant causal law.22
The necessary-condition (‘but-for’) test and the independently-sufficientcondition test, which usually are treated as distinct, alternative tests of
causation,23 are each simply corollaries of the NESS test. Rather than being
the exclusive test of causation, as some have argued or assumed, the
necessary-condition test works only as an inclusive test of causation, in
situations in which (as is usually true) there was only one set of antecedent
conditions that was or would have been sufficient for the occurrence of the
consequence on the particular occasion, or, if there was more than one
such set, the condition was necessary for the sufficiency of each of the sets.
In such situations, the NESS test reduces down to the necessary-condition
test. The independently-sufficient-condition test is similarly an inclusive
rather than exclusive test, which works if the relevant necessary condition
(eg, fire of a certain magnitude) in the fully instantiated antecedent of the
relevant causal law is fully instantiated by the conduct or event at issue (eg,
an actual fire of at least that magnitude). Implicit in the independentlysufficient-condition test is the requirement that the condition at issue be
necessary for the sufficiency of the set of antecedent conditions. Without
this requirement, totally irrelevant conditions could be treated as independently sufficient conditions merely by adding them to an already sufficient
set of existing antecedent conditions.
The NESS test subsumes but is more inclusive than the necessarycondition test, the independently-sufficient condition test, or the combination of these two tests. For example, if fire of X magnitude is required to
destroy a house, or water of X magnitude is required to overflow or burst
a dam, or X drops of poison are required to kill a person, and each of three
or more persons supplies one-half X of fire or water or poison, none of
their individual contributions is either necessary or independently sufficient
for the relevant injury, which, however, will occur if all the other necessary
antecedent conditions in the relevant causal law have been instantiated. If
we are limited to using the necessary-condition and independentlysufficient-condition tests, we must implausibly conclude that none of the
individuals contributed to the relevant injury, which instead somehow
mysteriously and spontaneously occurred. Under the NESS test, each
individual’s contribution is correctly found to be a cause, since it is
necessary for the sufficiency of a set of actual antecedent conditions that
includes only one of the other individuals’ contributions. Alternatively,

22
Wright, above n 6, at 1788-1807; Wright, above n 3, at 1018-42; Wright, Once More,
above n 12, at 1101-31; Wright, Legal Responsibility, above n 1, at 1440-51.
23
Eg, Restatement Second, above n 5, at § 432; Draft Restatement Third, above n 16, at
§§ 26, 27.
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each individual’s contribution is necessary for the sufficiency of a set of
actual antecedent conditions that is described as including contributions by
others of at least one-half X, which is itself an instantiated actual
condition.24
Contrary to what some have argued,25 the NESS analysis in cases of
causal overdetermination does not employ an unrealistic, counterfactual
assumption that the existing conditions omitted from the description of the
sufficient set of antecedent conditions did not actually exist. It rather ropes
off the excluded actual conditions, without denying their existence, in
order to determine whether the included, non-roped-off actual conditions
were sufficient by themselves for the occurrence of the injury, by asking
whether the included actual conditions constitute the complete instantiation of the antecedent of the relevant causal law.26
Similarly, the necessity aspect of the NESS test and its ‘but-for’ test
reduction do not result, as is commonly assumed,27 in a counterfactual
analysis of hypothetical other worlds or nonexistent situations. The focus
in the analysis of factual causation is (or should be) not on what might
have happened if things had been different, but rather on what actually did
happen and why. The necessity analysis simply involves a matching of the
24
Wright, above n 6, at 1792-94; Wright, Once More, above n 12, at 1106-7; Wright,
Legal Responsibility, above n 1, at 1442-45; Draft Restatement Third, above n 16, at § 27,
comments f, g & i. Hart and Honoré do not consider this type of situation, but rather,
apparently limit ‘causally relevant conditions’ under their version of the NESS test to
necessary or independently sufficient conditions. See Hart and Honoré, above n 3, at 112-13,
123-24, 206-7, 235-53. Fischer cites cases involving unnecessary and insufficient conditions
that supposedly are inconsistent with the NESS test. See Fischer, ‘Insufficient Causes’, above n
3, at 278-79, 286-88. However, Fischer once again confuses the causal issue with the liability
issue. In the cases that he cites, the courts acknowledge causal contribution but deny liability
because the contribution was not sufficiently material or perceptible or because the injury or
harm would have occurred anyway as a result of nonliable conditions. See Fischer, Omission
Cases, above n 3, at 1344-60; Wright, Once More, above n 12, at 1121 fn 172.
25
Eg, Fischer, Omission Cases, above n 3, at 1359, 1362; Fischer, Insufficient Causes,
above n 3, at 303, 307-8; Mark Kelman, ‘The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation
Judgments in Liberal Political Theory’ (1987) 63 Chicago-Kent Law Review 579, 602-6.
26
Wright, above n 3, at 1035-42.
27
Eg, Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999) 102-7; see
Wright, above n 6, at 1803-7. Honoré’s arguments focus on determining whether the
condition at issue ‘made a difference’ in a but-for sense, although at one point he
acknowledges that the possibility that the injury may have occurred anyway would not affect
a NESS condition’s causal status but may affect the injured person’s claim. Honoré, above, at
104; cf Wright, Legal Responsibility, above n 1, at 1434-67 (discussing the ‘no worse off’
limitation on the extent of legal responsibility for tortiously caused consequences). I once
assumed that the necessity aspect of the NESS test required a counterfactual analysis, in part
because I assumed that the necessity analysis had to be undertaken when assessing singular
instances of causation, rather than having previously been addressed during the elaboration of
the relevant causal generalisation. See Wright, above n 6, at 1803-4. However, I emphasised
that the ‘counterfactual’ analysis should proceed not by a conjectural exploration of what
might have happened in the absence of the condition at issue, but rather should focus on what
actually happened by fitting the existing conditions into the applicable causal generalisations.
Wright, above n 6, at 1804-7.
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condition at issue against the required conditions in the antecedent of the
relevant causal law, to see if it actually is part of the antecedent of the fully
instantiated causal law. One way to do this is to exclude or rope off the
condition being tested to see if the remaining included actual conditions
encompass all of the required conditions in the antecedent of the relevant
causal law. The other way is simply to ask if the actual condition being
tested is a required condition in the antecedent of the relevant fully
instantiated causal law.28 Note that one of these two equivalent sufficiency
analyses must be and is undertaken, implicitly if not explicitly, whenever
the but-for test is used.
Indeed, as I have previously noted,29 the necessity aspect of the NESS
test for singular instances of causation is a heuristic rather than an essential
analytic element of the test. The necessity aspect has already been taken
care of in the (proper) formulation of the relevant causal laws, which
include in their antecedents only those conditions necessary for the
sufficiency of the antecedent, as determined through experience and
scientific investigation. Our judgments regarding singular instances of
causation do and must rely on this acquired knowledge of causal laws,
even if the acquired knowledge is tentatively induced from the single
experience at issue—for example, the first time a child burns its hand in a
fire or on a hot stove.30
Thus, the test for singular instances of causation could (and perhaps
should) be stated as I initially stated it above, without any reference to
necessity: a condition was a cause of some consequence if and only if it was
part of the complete instantiation of the antecedent of a causal law that
links the antecedent and the consequent.31 In the hypotheticals involving
three or more individuals who each supply one-half of the fire, water, or
poison required as a necessary condition in the antecedent of the relevant
causal law, anyone who contributes to the instantiation of that necessary
condition in the antecedent is a cause of the consequent if all the other
conditions in the antecedent are also instantiated. It does not matter that
the relevant condition was more than minimally instantiated—that more
than enough fire, water, or poison was duplicatively or redundantly
supplied—unless the excess supply somehow resulted in the failure (the
lack of instantiation) of some other necessary condition in the antecedent
of the causal law. The necessity aspect of the NESS test for singular
instances of causation is merely a heuristic to try to ensure (1) that causally
irrelevant conditions (conditions that do not match a condition in the
antecedent of the relevant causal law) are not treated as causes and (2) that

28
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30
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Wright, above n 3, at 1039-42.
Wright, Legal Responsibility, above n 1, at 1445 fn 67; Wright, above n 3, at 1042.
Wright, above n 3, at 1031-34.
Text at n 19.
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we do not overlook preemptive causes, which prevent the antecedent of the
relevant causal law from being fully instantiated.
The same analysis applies to reasons for action or inaction. Although a
certain reason may not have been necessary or independently sufficient for
some decision, it contributed to that decision if it was considered by the
decision maker and it counted positively, rather than negatively or not at
all, in favour of the decision.32 Some theorists argue that volitional human
actions, unlike physical events, are neither subject to nor explainable in
terms of causal generalisations. Hart and Honoré acknowledge that
generalisations apply to human action, but they deny repeatability in (what
they assume to be) identical circumstances. They treat human actions as
being ‘induced’ by provided reasons or information or ‘occasioned’ by
provided opportunities rather than being caused, and as involving a ‘causal
connection’ only in a metaphorical or ‘near-causal’ sense.33 However, with
human actions as with physical events, if all the relevant conditions
(accumulated experience and knowledge, beliefs, goals, mood, and so
forth) were the same, surely the decision or action would also be the same.
To assert otherwise is to assert that human action is random or arbitrary.
Human action is less regular and predictable than physical events because
humans learn from prior experiences and new information, the range of
relevant conditions is much broader, and the applicable causal generalisations are much more complex and less well understood.34
Understanding that sufficiency in causal analysis means (being part of)
the complete instantiation of the antecedent of the relevant causal law is
critical for distinguishing situations involving causal duplication from
situations involving causal preemption. In the situation involving two fires,
each sufficient to burn down a house if it reaches the house, suppose that
one of the fires reaches the house and burns it down before the other fire
arrives. Clearly, the first fire caused the destruction of the house; the
second fire did not. Yet, empirically, the destruction of the house was
guaranteed by the second fire, whether or not the first fire existed; this is
why the but-for test (erroneously) fails to treat the first fire as a cause of

32
Wright, above n 3, at 1037; see Fischer, Insufficient Causes, above n 3, at 286 fn 39
(citing two illustrative cases).
33
Hart and Honoré, above n 3, at 22-23, 51-52, 55-57, 60-61; Honoré, above n 27, at
2-3, 96, 116-19.
34
See generally Tom L Beauchamp and Alexander Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of
Causation (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981) 314-27; John Mackie, The Cement of the
Universe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1974) 120-26; Michael Moore, ‘Causation and
the Excuses’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 1091, 1112, 1124-27, 1132-37; Honoré,
above n 27, at 117. Viewing human action as causally determined is not incompatible with
free will, given the very complex and goal-directed nature of human decision-making.
Conversely, the presence of a random or probabilistic element in human decision-making
would not undermine the concept of causation or make it impossible to provide causal
explanations of human actions. See Wright, above n 3, at 1028-31.
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the destruction of the house. Some theorists sometimes assume that the
guaranteed occurrence of the consequence is the sense of sufficiency
employed in the NESS test or proper causal analysis.35 If this were true, the
second fire as well as the first should be treated as a cause of the
destruction of the house, a second collapsed bridge further downstream as
well as the first collapsed bridge should be treated as a cause of the delay
of a ship travelling down a river, or a person’s drinking a deadly but slow
poison for which there is no antidote as well as being fatally shot
immediately after drinking the poison should be treated as a cause of the
person’s death. But none of these conclusions would be correct. Although
the relevant consequence may be guaranteed to occur, it is not guaranteed
that it will occur as a result of the condition that gave rise to the guarantee;
it may instead result from some other condition that preempts and
frustrates the causal process associated with the condition that gave rise to
the guarantee.
To be a cause, the condition at issue must be part of the complete
instantiation of the antecedent of the relevant causal law (usually in its
incompletely specified form as a causal generalisation). Only the first fire
was part of the complete instantiation of the antecedent of the firedestroys-house causal generalisation, which requires, among other things,
that the fire reach the house while it is still standing (undestroyed). That
necessary condition in the antecedent of the relevant causal law was
instantiated for the first fire, but not for the second fire. Similarly,
assuming that the ship went down the river as far as it could before having
to stop, only the first downstream collapsed bridge was part of the
complete instantiation of the river-blockage-stops-ship causal generalisation, which requires, among other things, that the ship reach the blockage
and either physically run into it or be stopped by the captain when he sees
the blockage. Those necessary conditions in the antecedent of the relevant
causal laws were instantiated for the first collapsed bridge, but not for the
second. The only way that the second collapsed bridge could be a cause of
the ship’s stopping is if the captain learned of it first and decided, based on
that knowledge, to stop immediately rather than continuing down the river
as far as the ship could go before stopping. The antecedent of the
death-by-shot causal generalisation was fully instantiated, but the antecedent of the death-by-slow-acting-poison causal generalisation was not. The
latter generalisation requires, among other things, that a certain amount of

35
See, eg, Fischer, Insufficient Causes, above n 3, at 310; Stapleton, Perspectives, above n
11, at 83, fns 56-57, 84, fns 62-63. Even Hart and Honoré occasionally confuse these two
issues. See Hart and Honoré, above n 3, at 239-40, 246-48, 250-51.
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time elapse after the swallowing of the poison in order for the poison to
cause death, but that necessary condition did not occur.36
Understanding that a condition was a cause of some consequence if and
only if it was part of the complete instantiation of the antecedent of a
causal law that links the antecedent and the consequent also enables one to
understand the requirements for proper proof of causation and the
methods that lawyers should and do employ to make persuasive arguments
regarding causation in a particular situation. Lawyers argue competing
causal stories, which are simply descriptions of the relevant causal generalisations. They build up a causal story by introducing particularistic
evidence of the actual existence on the particular occasion of the necessary
conditions in the antecedent of the relevant causal generalisation. The
more complete their proof of the instantiation of all the conditions in the
antecedent of the causal generalisation is, the greater is the ex post
probability that their causal story is the correct one. They undermine a
causal story by introducing evidence that one or more necessary conditions
in the antecedent of the causal generalisation did not exist on the particular
occasion. Conclusive proof of the nonexistence of even a single necessary
condition reduces the ex post probability of the causal story to zero,
regardless of how great its ex ante mathematical probability, based on its
general frequency of occurrence, might have been.37 As the court in Day v
Boston & Maine RR stated:
Quantitative [ex ante] probability, however, is only the greater chance. It is not
proof, nor even probative evidence, of the proposition to be proved. That in one
throw of the dice there is a quantitative probability, or greater chance, that a less
number of spots than sixes will fall uppermost is no evidence whatever that in a
given throw such was the actual result. Without something more, the actual
result of the throw would still be utterly unknown. The slightest real [particularistic instantiation] evidence that sixes did in fact fall uppermost would outweigh
all the probability otherwise.38

Such ex ante, frequency-based causal probabilities or, even worse, naked
statistics unrelated to causal generalisations—for example, a 75% probability that my dog bit someone because I own 75% of the dogs in the
36
Jane Stapleton agrees with this particular conclusion, but inconsistently argues in the
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traveller dies of thirst in the desert—that A is a cause of the traveller’s death, since the
traveller was bound to die once the water was poisoned. See Stapleton, Perspectives, above n
11, at 83-84, criticised in Wright, Once More, above n 12, at 1115-18. For further discussion,
see text following n 49.
37
LJ Cohen, The Probable and the Provable (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977)
248-55.
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area—cannot properly be used to establish actual causation in a particular
situation. Instead, what is required is concrete, particularistic evidence of
the actual instantiation of the consequent and all the necessary conditions
in the antecedent of the relevant causal generalisation. Such particularistic
evidence builds up, lowers, or zeroes the ex post probability that the
purported causal story is true. When the ex post probability for one causal
story is sufficiently great and the ex post probability for any competing
causal story is sufficiently low, a belief, with varying degrees of strength
depending on the weight of the evidence, is formed in the truth of the first
causal story. Contrary to what is unreflectively assumed by a great many
lawyers and courts, the civil standard of proof by a ‘preponderance of the
evidence’, properly understood, does not simply require a mere 50+%
‘more likely than not’ ‘balance of probability’, even when the probabilities
involved are ex post probabilities based on particularistic evidence of the
instantiation of the relevant causal law. Instead, proof by a preponderance
of the evidence requires (or should require) that the particularistic evidence
of instantiation of the relevant causal law induce a minimal ‘bare preponderance’ belief in the truth of the particular causal story.39
My insistence on a clear understanding of the concept of causation and
of what constitutes adequate proof of causation should not be confused
with a position that I do not advocate: that liability should never be
imposed in the absence of proof of actual causation. Although liability
despite disproof of causation is, in my view, unjust and hence improper,40
there are good reasons as a matter of justice to impose proportional or
even full liability in some situations in which the defendant’s wrongful
conduct may have caused some or all of the plaintiff’s injury, but it is
impossible for the plaintiff to prove that such causation occurred. If
liability is imposed in such cases, it is best conceived as liability for the
actual injury based on ‘second-best’ causation doctrines, such as shifted
burdens of proof or liability in proportion to the probability of causation,
rather than (as I once argued) being liability for the imposition of risk, even
if liability for the imposition of risk is limited to situations in which actual
injury occurred.41 As always, proper resolution of the normative liability
issue is more likely if the uncertainty over actual causation is explicitly
recognised and acknowledged.
The ‘decision causation’ cases discussed by Vaughan Black, in which
resolution of the causal issue requires evaluation of what a person
subsequently would have decided if the defendant had not behaved
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Wright, Legal Responsibility, above n 1, at 1430-31.
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tortiously,42 often raise such policy issues. These cases, unlike the situations
discussed above in which there was an actual decision and the issue is
whether some prior condition contributed to that decision,43 do require a
hypothetical, counterfactual inquiry—an inquiry into what decision would
have been made if the defendant had not behaved tortiously. Thus, while
Black is correct in arguing that the causal issues in these cases are not
necessarily more difficult to evaluate than the causal issues in other types
of cases, which also can involve difficult, structurally embedded proof
problems due to incomplete scientific knowledge about the causal processes involved, I believe he is incorrect in arguing that there is not a
significant difference between decision-causation cases and other cases.
The significant difference is the necessity of employing hypothetical,
counterfactual analysis.
The most common decision-causation cases are those involving a defendant’s tortious failure to provide a safeguard (device, information, or
warning), in which, as we have noted, the courts view the dispositive
causal issue as whether, if the safeguard had been provided, the person to
whom the safeguard should have been provided would have decided to act
(or not act) in a certain way, which would have prevented the injury that
occurred. If he would have, the failure to provide the safeguard was a
necessary condition for and hence a but-for (negative) cause of the injury.
If he would not have, the failure to provide the safeguard was not a cause,
but rather—as is discussed in part IV below—was preempted by the fact
that there would have been no attempt to use the safeguard.44 Courts
reasonably could decide in these cases to shift the burden of proof on
whether the safeguard would have been used to the defendant,45 or to
impose proportional liability based on the probability that the safeguard
would have been used.

IV.

OVERDETERMINED NEGATIVE CAUSATION

As was discussed in part II above, a negative cause of some consequence X
is a condition that contributes in a negative manner to the occurrence of X
through causal process A by causing the failure of a distinct causal process
B that, if it had occurred, would have prevented the occurrence of X by
causing the failure of causal process A. A negative cause of X is an
instantiation of a negative condition—the absence of a preventing
42
43
44
45

See Vaughan Black, ‘Decision Causation: Pandora’s Tool-Box’ ch 12.
Text at nn 32-34.
Text at nn 8-9.
See Fischer, Omission Cases, above n 3, at 1355-56.
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cause—in the completely instantiated antecedent of the causal generalisation for causal process A. This negative condition in causal process A is
instantiated by the failure of causal process B, which occurs if one of more
of the necessary positive conditions in causal process B was not instantiated.
If more than one condition in causal process B was not instantiated, the
failure of causal process B to occur was overdetermined. To determine
which of the non-instantiated conditions actually caused (rather than
merely guaranteed) its failure,46 we need to determine whether the multiple
non-instantiated conditions had a duplicative causal effect or, instead, one
or more of them preempted the potential causal effect of the others.
However, we cannot do this in the same way that we determine duplication
versus preemption for positive causal effects, by asking whether each of the
conditions at issue was part of the complete instantiation of the antecedent
of the relevant causal law. Instead, when determining which absent
conditions had the negative causal effect of causing the failure or nonoccurrence of a causal process rather than its successful completion, we
must analyse the sequencing and possible interdependency of the necessary
conditions in the antecedent of the relevant causal law for the failed causal
process.47
Consider a situation in which there was sufficient time to brake to stop a
car before it hit some object. The braking-stops-car causal process, if it
occurs, is a positive preventing cause that prevents the successful completion of the moving-car-hits-object-in-path causal process. When the brake
pedal is depressed and the car subsequently stops, we infer from those two
facts alone, which are instantiations of the consequent and a single
condition in the antecedent of the braking-stops-car causal generalisation,
that all of the very many conditions in the antecedent of that generalisation
and its underlying causal laws were instantiated.
If the brake pedal is not depressed, but the brake system was working
properly, the failure to depress the brake, which is a necessary condition in
the antecedent of the braking-stops-car causal generalisation, is a but-for
cause of the non-occurrence of the braking-stops-car causal process.
‘Non-occurrence’ seems more appropriate than ‘failure’ here since the
causal process was never initiated. Conversely, if the brake pedal is
depressed and the car fails to slow and stop, the braking-stops-car causal
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process was initiated but was not completed; it failed. We infer that it
failed as a result of something wrong with the braking system—that is, that
there was at least one non-instantiated condition in the antecedent of the
causal generalisation for the working of the braking system. If there was
only one non-instantiated condition, its non-instantiation was a but-for
cause of the failure of the braking system.
If there was more than one non-instantiated condition in the antecedent
of the causal generalisation for the working of the braking system—for
example, the lack of a bolt connecting the brake pedal to the lever rod
between it and the master cylinder and the lack of sufficient hydraulic fluid
in the master cylinder—the failure of the braking system was overdetermined. It was even more overdetermined if, as alleged in Saunders,48 the
driver did not attempt to use the brakes by (timely) depressing the brake
pedal. Each of these non-instantiated conditions independently guarantees
the non-occurrence or failure of the braking-stops-car causal process, but
only the failure to attempt to use the brakes had an actual negative causal
effect. The failure to attempt to use the brakes preempted the potential
negative causal effect of the other non-instantiated conditions in the
braking-stops-car causal process.
This conclusion is based on our knowledge of the sequence of events that
must take place for the occurrence of the braking-stops-car causal process,
which actually is a complex combination of a large number of more
discrete causal processes, each of which is dependent for its occurrence on
the occurrence of prior stages in the causal sequence. Some of the necessary
events, in order of occurrence, are: (1) the driver’s applying force to depress
the brake pedal; (2) the depression of the brake pedal operating a lever to
put pressure on the hydraulic brake fluid in the master cylinder; (3) the
pressure in the brake fluid being transmitted through pipes and tubes to the
brake cylinders; (4) the pressure in the brake cylinders pushing braking
pads against the rotating brake drum or disc in the wheel assembly; and (5)
the friction created by such contact slowing and stopping the rotation of
the wheels. Each of these stages of the braking-stops-car causal process,
which occur in sequence, is itself a causal process; each has its own set of
necessary antecedent conditions, most related to the structure and integrity
of the mechanical, hydraulic and electrical components of the various parts
of the braking system.
The failure of any prior stage in the sequence of events prevents the
causal process from proceeding any further in the sequence of dependent
events. It thus preempts the potential negative causal effect of any
non-instantiated conditions in subsequent stages, which would have caused
the causal process to fail if it had proceeded that far. When the very first
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event, the driver’s depressing the brake pedal, does not occur, the causal
process fails—actually never gets started—at that point in the causal
sequence. The causal process does not get as far as stage (2), although if it
had gotten that far, it would then have failed due to the missing bolt
connecting the brake pedal to the lever, which would have preempted the
potential negative causal effect of the insufficient brake fluid in the master
cylinder, which in turn would have caused the causal process to fail at stage
(3) if the causal process had proceeded that far.
A contrary conclusion is based on the erroneous idea, discussed above,49
that a condition was a cause of some consequence merely because it
guaranteed that the consequence would occur. Poisoning a person’s only
source of water guarantees that she will die, but not that she will die as a
result of the poisoning of the water; an intervening event, such as the
shooting of the person or the emptying of the water container, may occur
and preempt the potential positive causal effect of death by poisoning. The
collapse of a bridge on a river guarantees that a ship coming down the
river will be delayed, but not that the delay will be caused by the collapse
of the bridge; an intervening event, such as the ship’s engine failing or the
ship’s running aground or encountering another collapsed bridge further
upstream, may occur and preempt the potential positive causal effect of the
collapse of the bridge further downstream. Similarly, a defect in the
braking system, such as the missing bolt or the insufficient brake fluid,
guarantees that the braking system will not work, but not that the defect
will be a cause of the braking system’s not working; an intervening event,
the failure to attempt to use the brakes by pressing down on the brake
pedal, may occur and preempt the potential negative causal effect of the
defect in the braking system.
Duplicative as well as preemptive negative causation can occur. For
example, if one mechanic put insufficient hydraulic brake fluid into the
master cylinder for it to work and another failed to seal it properly so that
whatever fluid was in it would leak out, their respective omissions, which
negate required positive conditions for the occurrence of stage (3) of the
braking-stops-car causal process, are duplicative negative causes of the
failure of the braking system to work, due to the non-occurrence of stage
(3), when the brake pedal is subsequently depressed. Hart and Honoré
describe two similar situations:
[S]uppose that two switches need to be turned off in order to avert a fire, and
that X has a duty to turn off one, Y the other [but] neither does so and a fire
which would have been averted had they both performed their duty breaks
out . . .. Suppose, again, that a house can be built and profitably sold only if X
delivers bricks and Y mortar [but] both default in delivery so that the projected
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house cannot be built and sold . . .. [L]awyers and ordinary people would agree
in saying, in these cases of concurrent failure to intervene in a physical process or
to provide opportunities for gain, that the omission of each is causally relevant
to the ensuing harm and that each could in a proper case be held responsible for
it.50

In each of these situations, the dual omissions that overdetermine the
failure of the causal process at issue are assumed to occur in the same stage
of that causal process, rather than in different stages of a sequenced
process in which the occurrence of subsequent stages depends on the prior
occurrence of the previous stages. Although the building of a house occurs
in sequential, dependent stages, the bricks and mortar are used together
simultaneously in the same stage in the same causal process of mortaring
and laying bricks. The required use of one material is dependent on the
simultaneous rather than the prior use of the other material. The absence
of either material results in the failure of the house-building causal process
at the brick-laying stage. The simultaneous absence of both overdetermines
the failure of the brick-laying stage for the duration of their simultaneous
absence; there is duplicative negative causation. If instead there was a
simultaneous failure to deliver concrete for the foundation and lumber for
the framing of the house, the failure to deliver the concrete, which results
in the failure of the house-building causal process at the foundationbuilding stage, preempts the potential negative causal effect of the failure
to deliver the lumber, which is not needed until the subsequent framing
stage, the occurrence of which depends on the prior occurrence of the
foundation-building stage.
The two-switches hypothetical is insufficiently described. Assume that
the fire resulted from overheating of a wire in an electrical circuit because
the electrical load on the circuit was too great, that each of the two
switches independently controls a different operating appliance (a subcircuit) on the same circuit, and that both switches must be turned off to
reduce the load on the main circuit to a safe, non-fire-generating level.
Neither the operation of each switch nor its effect on the main circuit’s
load is dependent on the operation of the other switch. Instead, turning on
each switch initiates a distinct positive causal process—the operation of the
associated appliance with its particular load on the main circuit—that is
not affected by the operation of the other switch. The failure to turn off
each switch is a duplicative negative cause of the overloading of the main
circuit and hence of the fire, for which the overloading of the main circuit
is a necessary positive condition.
If the two switches control the same appliance, which operates and
overloads the circuit as long as at least one of the switches is on, the
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analysis is somewhat different but the conclusion is the same. If only one
switch is on, it is a but-for positive cause of the operation of the appliance
and of the fire. If both switches are on, they are duplicative independently
sufficient positive causes of the operation of the appliance and of the fire
(although only the first switch to be turned on initiated the operation of
the appliance). As before, neither switch’s operation affects the operation
of the other switch or the effect of the other switch as a positive cause of
the operation of the appliance. The only difference is that, in this scenario,
turning one switch off will not have the effect of turning the appliance off
unless the other switch also is off, but, as in the two-appliance scenario, it
does not matter whether one is turned off before the other or if they are
turned off simultaneously; not until they are both turned off will the
appliance’s operation (and the circuit overload) be terminated. Thus, the
failure to turn off either switch is a duplicative negative cause of the
circuit’s being overloaded and the resulting fire.

V.

CONCLUSION

Debates over the meaning and role of causation in attributions of legal
responsibility are hardly new. However, the debates have been much more
widespread and urgent in recent years, as advances in science combined
with mass production and distribution of products have created an
expanding number of risks and harms, which, however, are often difficult
to attribute to specific actors. In the current debates, as in past debates,
considerable confusion—and sometimes bad legal results—have been generated by the failure of many courts, lawyers, and theorists to clearly
distinguish the issue of factual causation from the issue of legal responsibility, for which a finding of factual causation (or at least the possibility of
factual causation) remains a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite.
Difficult normative issues of proper legal responsibility have gone unrecognised or been ignored by, on the one hand, judicial findings of ‘no
causation’ (and thus no liability) when factual causation clearly existed in
the particular situation and, on the other hand, judicial findings of
‘causation’ (and thus full liability) when only the probability or even mere
possibility of factual causation could be established. The necessary first
step in clear thinking about legal responsibility is to isolate and clarify the
concept of factual causation and the requirements for establishing factual
causation in particular situations. This chapter is an attempt to contribute
to that understanding.

